DURING the past century, and even for a longer time, the deserts of the Soudan have been the reservoir in which the forces of fanaticism, of rapine and violence have been collected to pour down upon the fertile valleys of Egypt. From 1820 to 1883, this territory, including Nubia and the Central African provinces as far south as the head waters of the Nile, formed a rather unmanageable and rebellious dependency of the Khedive; after a successful revolt of the Mahdi in 1884, the garrisons and governors were withdrawn from the territory south of Wady Halfa. But both before and after that date the border districts of Egypt were incessantly harassed by sanguinary raids of the restless desert Arabs, who only required the stimulus of a favorable opportunity and the bond of a common leader to sweep the provinces of Upper Egypt with their numbers and fanaticism. Such an occasion was the revolution in the Delta, headed by Arabi Pasha, and such a leader was the pretended Mahdi. Such an occasion, too, was the disastrous Italian campaign in Abyssinia, but the leader was wanting, and while the Kalifa Abdullahi endeavored to rouse his oppressed subjects to action, and concocted his schemes with King Menelik,the Anglo-Egyptian expeditionary force was already penetrating his dominions.

"CHINESE" GORDON.

      While the direct causes of last summer's campaign were of recent origin, yet the Soudan question has so long been the dismay of Egyptian politicians, that, to fully understand the position of the British War Office, it is necessary to look back more than a decade and a half.

MAP OF EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN — SHOWING TERRITORY IN 1883.

      In 1881, Egypt suffered from the uncommon complaint of a sovereign in advance of his people. The Khedive Tewfik possessed rather more enlightenment than executive tact, and by his favor to foreigners he provoked the formation of the "Egyptian Party," which adopted as its rallying-cry and motto, "Egypt for the Egyptians." At the head of this party was Arabi Pasha, the Minister of War, who presently abused his position and his popularity to practically depose the Khedive and to seize the supreme power himself. Tewflk was confined at Ramleh, and Arabi busied himself in strengthening the harbor defences of Alexandria, anticipating an armed interference by England or France.

      These defences at length became openly menacing to the British fleet, and Arabi was ordered to discontinue them. On his refusal, Alexandria was bombarded, the forts demolished and the rebel forces were obliged to evacuate the town. With as little delay as was possible, British regiments were sent to Africa, and with an army of English and Egyptian troops, Lord Wolseley completely defeated Arabi's forces at Tel-el-Kebir. The surrender of Cairo was demanded and received, and Tewfik was reinstated upon the throne.

ISMAIL PASHA.

      It was sufficiently plain to every one that to leave Egypt to her own resources at that critical period would be to abandon her to anarchy, and England was compelled to undertake the difficult and delicate task of a protectorate over an already dependent kingdom. France, which was nominally associated with England in the preservation of Egyptian order, but which had shirked the cost and responsibility of action, now demanded a share in the administration of affairs, a demand which it did not suit the purposes of the British Government to grant. Thus opposed, France raised an outcry against perfide Albion and for the speedy abolition of the protectorate, which cry has continued down to the present day.

      In the management of Egyptian finances, however, she was given a share, along with the other five great European powers. These finances were found to be in a hopelessly entangled condition, and were placed in the hands of a commission consisting of representatives of England, France, Austria, Russia, Germany and Italy, and known as the Caisse de la Dette. While the jealousies of the different nations involved sometimes led to difficulties in the council, the same causes tended to prevent mismanagement and fraud, and the results of the system adopted is shown to-day in the gratifying balance over expenditure.

      But however difficult the management of Egypt itself, the ministers of England found, directly, the control of the nominally subordinate province of the Soudan to be doubly so. That rather irregularly defined region along the upper waters of the Nile had for sixty years been slowly drained of its resources by the extortionate rule of the Egyptian governors and the razzias of the slave hunters. In 1882 the inhabitants had reached the last state of wretchedness, and only waited the appearance of a leader to break into revolt. That leader presented himself, and was received with an enthusiasm that shook the corrupt Egyptian administration to its base. This was the so-called Mahdi.

      The real Mahdi, a descendant of the family of Mahomet, had disappeared from the sight of men nearly a thousand years before, leaving the promise that he would one day return to subordinate the world to the authority of Islam. Mahomet Achemet, the son of a carpenter of Dongola, after becoming deeply versed in the theology of the Koran, gave himself out as the expected deliverer and proclaimed a holy war against the Infidel. It was the spark in the powder-magazine, and the Soudanese rose in thousands and rallied to his side. After defeating several bodies of Egyptian troops sent to take him, he invaded the Province of Kordofan in 1883, and set up his own government over Upper Nubia.

      There is no doubt but that the crimes of the Egyptian officials had been such as to excuse or to justify the most sanguinary vengeance, and for this reason among others, England declined to give any assistance in the recovery of the disaffected territory. However, the Khedive, on his own responsibility, despatched a force of Egyptian troops into the desert, under the command of the ill-fated Hicks Pasha. The result of the expedition is well known. Worn out by want of food, of water and of repose, the wretched Fellaheen troops were overwhelmed by the Mahdists and slain almost to a man, the British officers sharing their fate.

ARABI PASHA.

      It now became clearly impossible to hold the Soudan against the tremendous power of the Mahdi, and England insisted that the garrisons should be with- drawn and the territory evacuated. Egypt was compelled to acquiesce, but the operation of withdrawal seemed likely to prove a difficult one. There were small but important garrisons at Berber, Dongola, and Suakin, at Kassala and at Khartoum, and, to arrange for their safe removal, it was judged most advisable to send some British officer of renowned integrity and influence among the Soudanese into the enemy's country. This delicate and hazardous mission fell to the lot of that nineteenth century Bayard, General Gordon, who had already held high office in Upper Egypt. The inspiring and melancholy story of Gordon's heroic defence of Khartoum, when it was found impossible to evacuate it, is still familiar to every one. For more than eight months, contending against every obstacle of famine, disease and disaffectation within, and a warlike and numerous enemy without, he held the city to the last, and fell, sword in hand, when the gates were treacherously opened to the foe on the night of the 26th of January, 1885. The expedition sent to his relief, under Lord Wolseley and General Stewart, arrived a few days too late. So nearly was it in time that it actually met Gordon's gunboats on the river, which he had sent down to meet the expedition and whose crews were still ignorant of the fall of their chief.

MAP ILLUSTRATING THE GORDON WAR, WITH BATTLEFIELDS MARKED.

      This was the first occasion on which a military expedition had ever ascended the Nile, and Canada's share in the feat must not be forgotten. The long, light, whale-boats in which the troops were transported were navigated by a force of 500 Canadian voyageurs, assisted by blue-jackets and Kroomen.

OSMAN DIGNA.

      On receiving the decisive intelligence, the force immediately began to retrace its steps, and reached Egypt in safety. The troops were withdrawn from the district south of the Second Cataract, and the vast territory of the Soudan abandoned to the semi-religious authority of the Mahdi. In the eastern deserts, on the coast of the Red Sea, there was sharp fighting for a time, in which the Fellaheen regiments again showed their utter worthlessness against the Mahdist hordes, and were not only defeated but massacred. To balance these disasters, General Graham, with a British force, inflicted severe punishment on the Arabs under the wily Osman Digna, and forced them to retire inland toward the Nile. Shortly after these events, operations were suspended, in May, '85, to be renewed no more until the spring of 1896.

MAP SHOWING THE CONFINES OF EGYPT AFTER THE EVACUATION OF THE SOUDAN IN 1885, THE EXTENT OF THE MAHDISM IN CENTRAL AFRICA, THE DERVISH ENCROACHMENTS ON ABYSSINIA AND THE BATTLEFIELD OF THE RECENT ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.

      Not long after the cessation of hostilities, the Mahdi died of small-pox, an event which dealt a fatal blow to his cause in the Soudan. Most of his followers chose to regard his death as a palpable refutation of his claims to sanctity, and, while many of them hastened to renounce the services of so dubious a prophet, others cherished in their hearts the seeds of doubt and suspicion. This sentiment of disloyalty was increased by the conduct of the Mahdi's successors. Achemet had named three rulers to succeed him, known as Kalifas, the third of whom presently assumed supreme power over the whole territory of the desert. This was the despotic and blood-thirsty Abdullahi, the present holder of the title. Perceiving the futility of an appeal to religious fanaticism to support his throne, in that low ebb of Mahdist sentiment, he resolved to establish a military tyranny, a reign of terror, in fact: which program lie has faithfully carried out. He selected for the instrument of oppression his own powerful tribe of the Baggara. Upon them he lavished favors, immunities and rewards, and practically gave them the power of life and death over the other natives of the Soudan. Claiming to be the mouthpiece of Heaven, it became impiety to question his most outrageous decisions, and though his down-trodden subjects might deny the inspiration of the prophet, they were compelled to submit to the authority of the sovereign. The Soudan became the scene of an epoch of bloodshed and tyranny surpassing even the old days of the Egyptian regime. Individuals suspected of treason were summarily done away with; regiments or clans supposed to be disaffected were despatched on dangerous service, and it was contrived that few of the malcontents ever returned.

      A few years of such treatment completely destroyed the unity, the cohesion and the spirit of the old followers of the Mahdi. Outside the Kalifa's own bodyguard, not a chief or a regiment would have refused to join a rebellion that promised any chance of success. But such was the terror inspired through the whole country, that no one dared to lead, while all were ready to follow.

SLATIN PASHA.

      Abdullahi could not fail to perceive this atmosphere of disaffection, and, early in 1896, lie grasped at a means of clearing it away. It was at the critical point of the Italian campaign in Abyssinia; the disasters of the foreigners had aroused widespread enthusiasm throughout the Soudan, and a spark of the old spirit seemed to exist, which might be fanned into a flame. Abdullahi seized the moment, and decided to employ in a campaign against the Europeans the energies which might otherwise bring about his own deposition. So lie announced that the time was ripe for the destruction of the Infidel, hoisted the Green Banner of the Holy War, and called his people to arms. A partial treaty was made with King Menelik, and a strong force of Dervishes under Osman Digna sent to lay siege to Kassala, which was held by an Italian garrison. At the same time, numerous bands of raiders prepared to invade Egypt.

      Now, as Kassala is a point of great strategic importance, it was necessary that it should not pass beyond the control of Egypt, for whom Italy had held it in trust, as it were. Accordingly, both to relieve the imperilled city and to disperse the Dervishes who were gathering in force on the frontier, it was decided in London that a force of the Khedive's troops should advance to the regions of the Upper Nile. New Dongola was named as the object, but it was cautiously provided that the range of operations should be determined by the nature and extent of the resistance experienced, and the amount of difficulty experienced in keeping open the lines of communication.

      It is said that the plan of campaign was fully arranged in the British War Office before the Khedive was informed of the existence of the scheme, and as the expedition was to consist of Egyptian troops, and to be paid for with Egyptian money, he naturally felt the omission a slight to his dignity. This caused him to demur a little to the British plans, but, as he was conscious of the benefits which Egypt would derive from even the reconquest of Dongola, he afterwards gave his full assent and sanction to the expedition.

      France, however, on being informed of the project, at once put forward the theory that the campaign was designed to serve as an excuse for a prolongation of the British occupation, and that Khartoum would prove the real destination, rather than Dongola. As this accusation was not met with a very spirited denial by the English press and ministry, it gained credence over the whole of Europe, and caused considerable adverse criticism of England, who, in her policy of "splendid isolation," had claims on no one of the powers, except, perhaps, Italy. Thus when she announced that half a million sterling would be required from the Caisse de la Detta for the expenses of the campaign, France, with Russia, seized the opportunity to block the scheme as far as possible, and strenuously opposed the grant. The point was carried, however, by a vote of four to two — England, Germany, Austria and Italy favoring the measure — and the amount paid.

      The bondholders of France thereupon entered suit against the Commission for the sun in question, affirming the necessity of a unanimous vote to legalize the payment of money from the reserve. England, meanwhile, without paying much attention to the difficulties of the financial question, was proceeding with her preparations for the campaign.

THE KHEDIVE OF EGYPT.

      When the first information of these events reached the Dervish leaders, it was supposed that the attack would come from the direction of Suakin, and Osman Digna, with a considerable force, hurried to that district, where the first of the fighting took place. The Soudanese had taken up arms more readily than might have been expected, and though much of their zeal was doubtless due to their terror of the Kalifa, they were inspired by the anticipation that the Fellaheen troops of the Expedition would prove, as before, an easy prey. On learning their mistake, their ardor abated, and when the Anglo-Egyptian force had gained several successes, the tribesmen became so dispirited and disaffected that they had to be lashed forward to the fight with the Koorbash.

      The story of the work of last summer and autumn has been told too often to be repeated here. It was deserving of more interest than it obtained, and cannot but be gratifying to English sentiment all over the world. It is, in fact, a most striking example of the effects of British military training. Though the Expedition was nominally an Egyptian one, composed chiefly of native troops, it was commanded by an Englishman, and was a part of that army which has for ten years been under the influence of English officers and English discipline. The disgraceful behaviour of these troops in 1885 will be recollected, and some doubts were felt as to the advisability of allowing a Fellaheen army to go into the desert with so slender a backing of British soldiers. But, in fact, nothing has excited more admiration than the gallant conduct of these same native troops, who vied with the English regiments in the faithful performance of their duty, sustained the hardships of climate, of privation and of disease with cheerful fortitude, and whose coolness and spirit in action would seem to render them the equal of any troops in the world. It is difficult to believe that they are of the same race as the miserable fugitives w-ho actually knelt before the pursuing enemy on the field of Teb, and offered their necks to the stroke.

      As a piece of scientific warfare, nothing could have been more admirably arranged than the whole campaign. Nothing was left to chance; no contingency was unprovided for. The Sirdar, Sir Herbert Horatio Kitchener, had formulated his plans to the smallest detail, and, splendidly supported as he was by his rank and file, they worked out with the precision of machinery. The half-million estimate proved inadequate to the expenses, and frequently he was impeded by a lack of sufficient supplies and facilities for transport; the cholera infested his camp for several weeks, and storms of wind and rain, such as had previously been almost unknown in the Soudan, tore up his railway and wrecked his steamers. Yet, in spite of all these obstacles, lie moved forward with a rapidity that completely disconcerted the Dervishes, and brought the Expedition to a triumphant close with a death-list smaller than might have been deemed possible for a campaign against such an enemy.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR H. H. KITCHENER, SIRDAR OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY.

      To a great extent, Kitchener was enabled to plan with such accuracy by the splendid work of the Intelligence Department, of which Slatin Pasha was at the head. This remarkable man, the author of that luridly-entitled book, "Fire and Sword in the Soudan," had been for some ten years a prisoner among the Mahdists of the deserts, and was intimately acquainted with their chiefs, their sentiments and their condition. On his escape, not long ago, he placed all this information at the disposal of the British Government, which appointed him to the head of that department of the Expedition in which he proved of such value. Repeated efforts were made by the Dervish leaders to induce him to return to their ranks, and the Kalifa himself is said to have expressed an opinion that the consequences of Slatin's escape would prove more disastrous than the loss of an army.

      A remarkably striking feature in the history of the campaign is the change in the spirit and tactics of the enemy. The disastrous effects of the Kalifa's tyranny showed itself in the heavy desertions from the Dervish forces, and the decline of Mahdism in the complete absence of the old time reckless fanatic dash, in which the true believer took no account whatever of odds, but aimed solely at slaying as many of the infidels as possible before a shot won him his Paradise. The leaders tried in vain to revive this spirit. Abdullahi pronounced the cholera and the cyclone to be the hand of God showing itself against the foolhardy invaders, and the Emir of Berber declared that he had seen in a vision the souls of the slain at Ferket banqueting with the Houris in Paradise. But the people doubted alike the Emir's vision and the Kalifa's theology, and Dervish loyalty diminished as the victorious force advanced.

      At this time of writing, it is reported that the enemy have entirely evacuated Dongola Province and are massing around Omdurman and Khartoum, where there seems no intention to follow them at present. The plan of the campaign has been from the first to secure every foot of vantage gained. Where Egyptian power has come, it has come to stay. The forts at Akasheh are a sign of this, and the railroad, constructed with such marvellous rapidity from Wady Halfa up the river, is an indication that every Soudanese can understand. In accordance with this policy, it has been determined to strengthen and garrison Dongola, to appoint British and Egyptian officials to reform the government, and to restore it, as far as possible, to its one-time flourishing condition. When this is accomplished, the frontier may be pushed yet farther southward, and there is no doubt but that ultimately Khartoum, the "Queen of the Soudan," will pass once more into the hands of Egypt.

      Mindful of her former connection with English operations on the Nile, Canada has not been behind in the present campaign. We must not forget, nor is there any danger of our forgetting, the splendid offer of the Eighth New Brunswick Hussars for service in the Soudan — service which for danger and hardship is unsurpassed by any in the world. For a variety of reasons the English War Office judged it inadvisable to accept their offer, partly because more experienced cavalry would be required for work of such difficulty, and partly because it was considered unwise to remove one of Canada's crack regiments at a time when the military reorganization of the colony had been decided upon. This, however, was not the fault of the Eighth Hussars, and their offer displays a patriotism and spirit of which Canadians may well be proud.

Frank L. Pollock.